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Abstract
Production to order and production in advance have been compared in many frame-
works. In this paper we investigate a production in advance version of the capacity-
constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth mixed duopoly game and determine the solution of
the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash-
equilibrium exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike
the production-to-order case, the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultane-
ous moves. An analysis of the public firm’s impact on social surplus is also carried
out. All the results are compared with those of the production-to order version of the
respective game and with those of the mixed duopoly timing games.
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1 Introduction
We can distinguish between production-in-advance (PIA) and production-to-order (PTO)
concerning how the firms organize their production in order to satisfy the consumers’
demand.1 In the former case production takes place before sales are realized, while in
the latter one sales are determined before production takes place. Markets of perishable
goods are usually mentioned as examples of advance production in a market. Phillips,
Menkhaus, and Krogmeier (2001) emphasized that there are also goods which can be
traded both in a PIA and in a PTO environment since PIA markets can be regarded as
a kind of spot market whereas PTO markets as a kind of forward market. For example,
coal and electricity are sold in both types of environments.
The comparison of the PIA and PTO environments has been carried out in experimen-
tal and theoretical frameworks for standard oligopolies.2 For instance, assuming strictly
increasing marginal cost functions Mestelman, Welland, and Welland (1987) found that in
∗Corresponding author: Attila Tasna´di, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Economics, Corvinus
University of Budapest, Fo¨va´m te´r 8, Budapest H-1093, Hungary. E-mail attila.tasnadi@uni-corvinus.hu.
Tasna´di gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Pallas Athe´ne´ Domus Sapientiae foun-
dation through its PADS Leading Researcher Program.
1The PIA game is also frequently called the price-quantity game or briefly PQ-game.
2We call an oligopoly standard if all firms are profitmaximizers, which basically means that they are
privately owned.
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an experimental posted offer market the firms’ profits are lower in case of PIA. For more
recent experimental analyses of the PIA environment we refer to Davis (2013) and Orland
and Selten (2016). In a theoretical paper Shubik (1955) investigated the pure-strategy
equilibrium of the PIA game and conjectured that the profits will be lower in case of
PIA than in case of PTO. Levitan and Shubik (1978) and Gertner (1986) determined the
mixed-strategy equilibrium for the constant unit cost case without capacity constraints.3
Assuming constant unit costs and identical capacity constraints, Tasna´di (2004) found
that profits are identical in the two environments and that prices are higher under PIA
than under PTO. Zhu, Wu, and Sun (2014) showed for the case of strictly convex cost
functions that PIA equilibrium profits are higher than PTO equilibrium profits. In addi-
tion, considering different orders of moves and asymmetric cost functions Zhu, Wu, and
Sun (2014) demonstrated that the leader-follower PIA game leads to higher profit than
the simultaneous-move PIA game.4
Concerning our theoretical setting, the closest paper is Tasna´di (2004) since we will
investigate the constant unit cost case with capacity constraints. The main difference is
that we will replace one profit-maximizing firm with a social surplus maximizing firm, that
is we will consider a so-called mixed duopoly. We have already considered the PTO mixed
duopoly in Balogh and Tasna´di (2012) for which we found (i) the payoff equivalence
of the games with exogenously given order of moves, (ii) an increase in social surplus
compared with the standard version of the game, and (iii) that an equilibrium in pure
strategies always exists in contrast to the standard version of the game.5 In this paper we
demonstrate for the PIA mixed duopoly the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies,
(weakly) lower social surplus than in case of the PTO mixed duopoly and the emergence
of simultaneous moves as a solution of a timing game.
It is also worthwhile to relate our paper briefly to the literature on mixed oligopolies.
In a seminal paper Pal (1998) investigates for mixed oligopolies the endogenous emergence
of certain orders of moves. Assuming linear demand and constant marginal costs, he shows
for a quantity-setting oligopoly with one public firm that, in contrast to our result, the
simultaneous-move case does not emerge. Matsumura (2003) relaxes the assumptions of
linear demand and identical marginal costs employed by Pal (1998). The case of increasing
marginal costs in Pal’s (1998) framework has been investigated by Tomaru and Kiyono
(2010). In line with our result on the timing of moves Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) obtained the en-
dogenous emergence of simultaneous moves for a heterogeneous goods price-setting mixed
duopoly timing game. In case of emission taxes Lee and Xu (2018) find that the sequential-
move (simultaneous-move) game emerges in the equilibrium of the mixed duopoly timing
game under significant (insignificant) environmental externality. There is also an evolv-
ing literature on managerial mixed duopolies, for instance, Nakamura (2018) shows that
in this case a sequential order of moves emerges in which the private firm with a price
contract moves first, while the public firm with a quantity contract moves second.
3Gertner (1986) also derived some important properties of the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the PIA
game for strictly convex cost functions. For more on the PIA case see also Bos and Vermeulen (2015),
van den Berg and Bos (2017), and Montez and Schutz (2018).
4From the mentioned papers only Zhu, Wu, and Sun (2014) considered sequential orders of moves. For
more on standard duopoly leader-follower games we refer to Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Deneckere and
Kovenock (1992) and Tasna´di (2003) in the Bertrand-Edgeworth framework. Furthermore, Din and Sun
(2016) extended Zhu, Wu, and Sun (2014) to mixed duopolies.
5We refer the reader also to Bako´ and Tasna´di (2017) which proves the validity of the Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) result for mixed duopolies by employing the Kreps and Scheinkman tie-breaking rule
at the price-setting stage.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our frame-
work, Sections 3-5 contain the analysis of the three games with exogenously given order
of moves, Section 6 solves the timing game, and we conclude in Section 7.
2 The framework
The demand is given by function D on which we impose the following restrictions:
Assumption 1. The demand function D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a
and the vertical axis at price b. D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice continuously
differentiable on (0, b); moreover, D is right-continuous at 0, left-continuous at b and
D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
Clearly, any price-setting firm will not set its price above b. Let us denote by P the
inverse demand function. Thus, P (q) = D−1 (q) for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b, and P (q) = 0
for q > a.
On the producers side we have a public firm and a private firm, that is, we consider a so-
called mixed duopoly. We label the public firm as 1 and the private firm as 2. Henceforth,
we will also label the two firms as i and j, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Our assumptions
imposed on the firms’ cost functions are as follows:
Assumption 2. The two firms have identical c ∈ (0, b) unit costs up to the positive
capacity constraints k1, k2 respectively.
We shall denote by pc the market clearing price and by pM the price set by a monopolist
without capacity constraints, i.e. pc = P (k1 + k2) and p
M = arg maxp∈[0,b](p− c)D (p). In
what follows p1, p2 ∈ [0, b] and q1, q2 ∈ [0, a] stand for the prices and quantities set by the
firms.
For any firm i and for any quantity qj set by its opponent j we shall denote
by pmi (qj) the profit maximizing price on firm i’s residual demand curve D
r
i (p, qj) =
(D(p)− qj)+ with respect to its capacity constraint, i.e. pmi (qj) = arg maxp∈[0,b](p −
c) min{Dri (p, qj) , ki}. Clearly, pmi is well defined whenever c < P (qj) and Assumptions
1-2 are satisfied. If c ≥ P (qj), then pmi (qj) is not unique, as any price pi ∈ [0, b] together
with quantity qi = 0 results in pii = 0 and pii cannot be positive. For notational convenience
we define pmi (qj) by b in case of c ≥ P (qj).
For a given quantity qj we shall denote the inverse residual demand curve of firm i
by Ri(·, qj). In addition, we shall denote by qmi (qj) the profit maximizing quantity on
firm i’s inverse residual demand curve subject to its capacity constraint, i.e. qmi (qj) =
arg maxq∈[0,ki](Ri(q, qj)− c)q. It can be checked that Ri(qi, qj) = P (qi + qj) and qmi (qj) =
Dri (p
m
i (qj), qj).
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Let us denote by pdi (qj) the smallest price for which
(pdi (qj)− c) min
{
ki, D
(
pdi (qj)
)}
= (pmi (qj)− c)qmi (qj),
whenever this equation has a solution.7 Provided that the private firm has ‘sufficient’
capacity, that is max{pc, c} < pm2 (k1), then if it is a profit-maximizer, it is indifferent to
6Note that Dri (p
m
i (qj), qj) ≤ ki since pmi (qj) ≥ P (ki + qj).
7The equation defining pdi (qj) has a solution for any qj ∈ [0, kj ] if, for instance, pmi (qj) ≥ max{pc, c},
which will be the case in our analysis when we refer to pdi (qj).
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whether serving residual demand at price level pm2 (q1) or selling min{k2, D
(
pd2(q1)
)} at the
weakly lower price level pd2(q1). Observe that if Ri(ki, qj) = p
m
i (qj), then p
d
i (qj) = p
m
i (qj).
8
We shall denote by q˜j the largest quantity for which q
m
i (q˜j) = ki in case of p
M ≤ P (ki) (i.e.
qmi (0) = ki), and zero otherwise. From Deneckere and Kovenock (1992, Lemma 1) it follows
that pdi (·) and pmi (·) are strictly decreasing on [q˜j , kj ]. Moreover, qmi (·) is strictly decreasing
on [q˜j , kj ] and constant on [0, q˜j ], and therefore q˜j = inf{qj ∈ [0, a] | qmi (qj) < ki} is always
uniquely defined.
We assume efficient rationing on the market, and thus, the firms’ demands equal
∆i (D, p1, q1, p2, q2) =

D (pi) if pi < pj ,
Ti(p, q1, q2), if p = pi = pj
(D (pi)− qj)+ if pi > pj ,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, where Ti stands for a tie-breaking rule. We will consider two sequential-
move games (one with the public firm as the first mover and one with the private firm as
the first-mover) and a simultaneous-move game. We employ the same tie-breaking rule as
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992).
Assumption 3. If the two firms set the same price, then we assume for the sequential-
move games that the demand is allocated first to the second mover9 and for the
simultaneous-move game that the demand is allocated in proportion of the firms’ ca-
pacities.
Now we specify the firms’ objective functions. The public firm aims at maximizing
total surplus, that is,
pi1(p1, q1, p2, q2) =
∫ min{(D(pj)−qi)+,qj}
0
Rj(q, qi)dq +
∫ min{a,qi}
0
P (q)dq − c(q1 + q2)
=
{ ∫ min{D(pj),q1+q2}
0 P (q)dq − c(q1 + q2) if D(pj) > qi,∫ min{D(pi),qi}
0 P (q)dq − c(q1 + q2) if D(pj) ≤ qi,
(1)
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ pj ≤ b. We illustrate social surplus in Figure 1.
The private firm is a profitmaximizer, and therefore,
pi2(p1, q1, p2, q2) = p2 min {q2,∆2 (D, p1, q1, p2, q2)} − cq2. (2)
We divide our analysis into three cases.
1. The strong private firm case, where we assume that qm2 (k1) < k2 and P (k1) > c. This
means that the private firm’s capacity is large enough to have strategic influence on
the outcome and the public firm cannot capture the entire market.
2. The weak private firm case, where we assume that qm2 (k1) = k2 and P (k1) > c. In
this case the private firm’s capacity is not large enough to have strategic influence
on the outcome, but it has a unique profit-maximizing price on the residual demand
curve.
8This can be the case if pM < P (k1).
9This ensures for the case when the public firm moves first the existence of a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in order to avoid the consideration of ε-equilibria implying a more difficult analysis without
substantial gain.
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Figure 1: Social surplus
3. The high unit cost case, where we assume that c ≥ P (k1). In this case if the public
firm produces at its capacity level, then there is no incentive for the private firm to
enter the market, because the cost level is too high.
Clearly, the three cases are well defined and disjunct from each other.
We now determine all the equilibrium strategies of both firms for the three possible
orderings of moves in each of the three main cases. Within every case we begin with the
simultaneous moves subcase, thereafter we focus on the public-firm-moves-first subcase,
finally we analyze the private-firm-moves-first subcase. The results are always illustrated
with numerical examples. For better visibility, the most interesting equilibria are depicted.
3 The strong private firm case
The following two inequalities remain true for the simultaneous moves and public leader-
ship cases.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) < k2 and P (k1) > c we must have in case of
simultaneous moves and public leadership that
p∗2 ≥ pd2(q∗1) (3)
in any equilibrium (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) in which q∗1 > 0.
Proof. We obtain the result directly from the definition of pd2(q1). For any q1 ∈ [0, k1], the
private firm is better off by setting p2 = p
m
2 (q1) and q2 = q
m
2 (q1) than by setting any price
p2 < p
d
2(q1) and any quantity q2 ∈ [0, k2].
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) < k2 and P (k1) > c we have in case of
simultaneous moves and public leadership that
p∗2 ≤ pm2 (0) = max{P (k2), pM} (4)
in any equilibrium (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2).
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Proof. Suppose that p∗2 > max{P (k2), pM}. If p∗2 ≤ p∗1, then the private firm would
be better off by setting price max{P (k2), pM} and quantity D
(
max{P (k2), pM}
)
. If
p∗2 > p∗1, then the private firm serves residual demand, and therefore it could bene-
fit from switching to action (pm2 (q
∗
1), q
m
2 (q
∗
1)),
(
max{P (k2), pM}, D
(
max{P (k2), pM}
))
, or
(p∗1 − ε,min {k2, D (p∗1 − ε)}), where ε is a sufficiently small positive value. For both cases
we have obtained a contradiction.
3.1 Simultaneous moves
For the case of simultaneous moves we have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium family,10
which contains profiles where the private firm maximizes its profit on the residual demand
choosing p∗2 = pm2 (q∗1) and q∗2 = qm2 (q∗1), while the public firm can choose any price level not
greater than pd2(q
∗
1) and produce any non-negative amount up to its capacity. It is worth
emphasizing that in case of pm2 (q
∗
1) = p
d
2(q
∗
1) the private firm can sell its entire capacity.
Proposition 1 (Simultaneous moves). Let Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) < k2 and P (k1) > c
be satisfied. A strategy profile
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗
1, q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)) (5)
is for a quantity q∗1 ∈ (0, k1] and for any price p∗1 ∈
[
0, pd2 (q
∗
1)
]
or for any q∗1 = 0 and any
p∗1 ∈ [0, b] a Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if
pi1
(
pd2 (q
∗
1) , q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)
)
≥ pi1 (P (k1) , k1, pm2 (q∗1) , qm2 (q∗1)) , 11 (6)
where there exists a nonempty closed subset H of [0, k1] satisfying condition (6).
12 Finally,
no other equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Proof. Assume that (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) is an arbitrary equilibrium profile. We divide our anal-
ysis into three subcases. In the first case (Case A) we have p∗1 = p∗2, in the second one
(Case B) p∗1 > p∗2 holds true, while in the remaining case we have p∗1 < p∗2 (Case C).
Case A: We claim that p∗1 = p∗2 implies q∗1+q∗2 = D(p∗2). Suppose that q∗1+q∗2 < D(p∗2).
Then13 because of p∗2 > max{pc, c} by a unilateral increase in output the public firm could
increase social surplus or the private firm could increase its profit; a contradiction. Suppose
that q∗1 + q∗2 > D(p∗2). Then the public firm could increase social surplus by decreasing its
output or if q∗1 = 0, the private firm could increase its profit by producing only D(p∗2); a
contradiction.
We know that we must have p∗1 = p∗2 ≥ pd2(q∗1) by Lemma 1. Assume that q∗1 > 0. Then
we must have q∗2 = min{k2, D(p∗2)}, since otherwise the private firm could benefit from
reducing its price slightly and increasing its output sufficiently (in particular, by setting
p2 = p
∗
2 − ε and q∗2 = min{k2, D(p2)}). Observe that pm2 (0) = pd2(0), pm2 (q1) = pd2(q1) for
all q1 ∈ [0, q˜1] and pm2 (q1) > pd2(q1) for all q1 ∈ (q˜1, k1].14 Moreover, it can be verified by
the definitions of pm2 (q
∗
1) and p
d
2(q
∗
1) that q
∗
1 + k2 ≥ D(pd2(q∗1)) ≥ D(p∗2), where the first
inequality is strict if q∗1 > q˜1. Thus, q∗1 > q˜1 is in contradiction with q∗2 = min{k2, D(p∗2)}
10Provided that certain conditions hold true.
11Clearly, P (k1) < p
m
2 (q
∗
1), i.e. k1 > D (p
m
2 (q
∗
1)) = q
m
2 (q
∗
1) is a necessary condition for (6).
12In particular, there exists a subset [q, k1] of H.
13Observe that by Lemma 1, the monotonicity of pd2(·), qm2 (k1) < k2 and P (k1) > c, we have p∗2 ≥
pd2(q1) ≥ pd2(k1) > max{pc, c}.
14We recall that q˜i has been defined after p
d
i (qj).
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since we already know that q∗1 + q∗2 = D(p∗2) in Case A. Hence, an equilibrium in which
both firms set the same price and the public firm’s output is positive exists if and only if
pm2 (q
∗
1) = p
d
2(q
∗
1) (i.e., q
∗
1 ∈ (0, q˜1)) and (6) is satisfied. This type of equilibrium appears in
(5) with q∗2 = qm2 (q∗1) = k2.
Moreover, it can be verified that (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) = (pm2 (0), 0, pm2 (0), qm2 (0)) is an equilib-
rium profile in pure strategies if and only if
pi1(p
m
2 (0), 0, p
m
2 (0), q
m
2 (0)) ≥ pi1(P (k1), k1, pm2 (0), qm2 (0)), (7)
where we emphasize that pm2 (0) = max{P (k2), pM} and qm2 (0) = D(max{P (k2), pM}).
Case B: Suppose that p∗1 > p∗2 ≥ pd2(q∗1) and D(p∗2) > q∗2. Then the public firm
could increase social surplus by setting price p1 = p
∗
2 and q1 = min{k1, D(p∗2) − q∗2}; a
contradiction.
Assume that p∗1 > p∗2 ≥ pd2(q∗1) and D(p∗2) = q∗2. Then in an equilibrium we must have
q∗1 = 0, p∗2 = pm2 (0) and q∗2 = qm2 (0). Furthermore, it can be checked that these profiles
specify equilibrium profiles if and only if equation (6) is satisfied.
Clearly, p∗1 > p∗2 ≥ pd2(q∗1) and D(p∗2) < q∗2 cannot be the case in an equilibrium since
the private firm could increase its profit by producing q2 = D(p
∗
2) at price p
∗
2. Finally, by
Lemma 1 p∗2 < pd2(q∗1) cannot be the case either.
Case C: In this case p∗2 = pm2 (q∗1) and q∗2 = qm2 (q∗1) must hold, since otherwise the
private firm’s payoff would be strictly lower. In particular, if the private firm sets a
price not greater than p∗1, we are not anymore in Case C; if q∗2 > min{Dr2(p∗2, q∗1), k2},
then the private firm either produces a superfluous amount or is capacity constrained;
if q∗2 < min{Dr2(p∗2, q∗1), k2}, then the private firm could still sell more than q∗2; and if
q∗2 = min{Dr2(p∗2, q∗1), k2}, then the private firm will choose a price-quantity pair maxi-
mizing profits with respect to its residual demand curve Dr2(·, q∗1) subject to its capacity
constraint. In addition, in order to prevent the private firm from undercutting the public
firm’s price we must have p∗1 ≤ pd2 (q∗1).
Clearly, for the given values p∗1, p∗2 and q∗2 from our equilibrium profile the public firm
has to choose a quantity q′1 ∈ [0, k1], which maximizes function f(q1) = pi1 (p∗1, q1, p∗2, q∗2)
on [0, k1]. We show that q
′
1 = q
∗
1 must be the case. Obviously, it does not make sense for
the public firm to produce less than q∗1 since this would result in unsatisfied consumers.
Observe that for all q1 ∈ [q∗1,min {D (p∗2) , k1}]
f(q1) =
∫ D(p∗2)−q1
0
(R2(q, q1)− c) dq +
∫ q1
0
(P (q)− c) dq − c(q1 − q∗1) =
=
∫ D(p∗2)
0
P (q)dq −D(p∗2)c− c(q1 − q∗1). (8)
Since only −c(q1 − q∗1) is a function of q1 we see that f is strictly decreasing on
[q∗1,min {D (p∗2) , k1}].
Subase (i): In case of k1 ≤ D (p∗2) we have already established that q∗1 maximizes f
on [0, k1]. Moreover, (p
∗
1, q
∗
1) maximizes pi1 (p1, q1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) on [0, p
∗
2)× [0, k1] since equation
(8) is not a function of p∗1. Hence, for any p1 ≤ pd2 (q∗1) such that p1 < p∗2 we have that
(p1, q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)) specifies a Nash equilibrium for any q1 ∈ [0, k1] satisfying k1 ≤
D (pm2 (q
∗
1)). However, note that in case of q
∗
1 ∈ [0, q˜1] and p1 = pd2 (q∗1) we are leaving Case
C and obtain a Case A Nash equilibrium.
Observe that pm2 (k1) > max {pc, c} implies that k1 < D (pm2 (k1)), and therefore we
always have Subcase (i) equilibrium profiles. Since D (pm2 (·)) is a continuous and strictly
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increasing function, interval [q˜1, k1] ∩ (0, k1] determines the set of quantities yielding an
equilibrium for Subcase (i).
Subase (ii): Turning to the more complicated case of k1 > D (p
∗
2), we also have to
investigate function f above the interval [D (p∗2) , k1] in which region the private firm does
not sell anything at all at price p∗2 and
f(q1) =
∫ min{q1,D(p∗1)}
0
(P (q)− c) dq − cq∗2 − c (q1 −D (p∗1))+ . (9)
Observe that we must have P (k1) < p
∗
2. If the public firm is already producing quantity
q1 = D (p
∗
2), the private firm does not sell anything at all and contributes to a social loss
of cq∗2. Therefore, f(q) is increasing on [D (p∗2) ,min {D (p∗1) , k1}].
Assume that k1 ≤ D (p∗1). Then for any p1 ≤ pd2 (q∗1) we get that
(p1, q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
pi1
(
pd2 (q
∗
1) , q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)
)
≥ pi1
(
pd2 (q
∗
1) , k1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)
)
=
= pi1 (P (k1) , k1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)) , (10)
where the last equality follows from the inequalities p∗1 ≤ P (k1) ≤ p∗2 valid for this case and
the fact that social surplus is maximized in function of (p1, q1) subject to the constraint
that the private firm does not sell anything at all if the public firm sets an arbitrary price
not greater than P (k1) and produces k1.
Assume that k1 > D (p
∗
1). Therefore, f(q) would be decreasing on [D (p
∗
1) , k1]. However,
it can be checked that the public firm could increase social surplus by switching to strategy
(P (k1), k1) from strategy (p
∗
1, D (p
∗
1)). In addition, any strategy (p1, k1) with p1 ≤ P (k1)
maximizes social surplus subject to the constraint that the private firm does not sell
anything at all. Therefore,
(
pd2 (q
∗
1) , q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)
)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if condition (6) is satisfied. Comparing equation (10) with equation (6), we can observe
that we have derived the same necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile
being a Nash equilibrium, which is valid for Subcase (ii).
So far we have established that there exists a function g, which uniquely determines
the highest equilibrium price as a function of quantity q produced by the public firm.
Clearly, g(q) = pd2(q), where the domain of g is not entirely specified. At least we know
from Subcase (i) that the domain of g contains [q˜1, k1]. Observe also that the equilibrium
profiles of Subcase (i) satisfy condition (6). Let u (q1) = pi1
(
pd2 (q1) , q1, p
m
2 (q1) , q
m
2 (q1)
)
and v (q1) = pi1 (P (k1) , k1, p
m
2 (q1) , q
m
2 (q1)). Hence, q1 determines a Nash equilibrium
profile if and only if u(q1) ≥ v(q1). It can be verified that u and v are continuous, and
therefore, set H = {q ∈ [0, k1] | u(q) ≥ v(q)} is a closed set containing [q˜, k1].
For the illustration of the Nash equilibrium profile mentioned in the statement let
D(p) = 1− p, k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.4, and c = 0.1. Now the following values can be calculated
directly from the exogenously given data: pc = 0.1, pm2 (k1) = 0.3, q
m
2 (k1) = 0.2, p
d
2(k1) =
0.2. Since pm2 (k1) > p
d
2(k1) we have
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) =
(
p∗1, q
∗
1,
1− q∗1 − c
2
,
1− q1 + c
2
)
in equilibrium, where q∗1 ∈ [0, 0.5] and p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.2].
In particular, if q∗1 = k1 = 0.5 and p∗1 = pd2(k1) = 0.2, then p∗2 = 0.3 and q∗2 = 0.2
(see Figure 2). Calculating the social surplus (the sum of dark gray and light gray areas
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in Figure 2) and the private firm’s profit (the light gray area indicated by pi2), we obtain
pi1 = 0.435 and pi2 = 0.04. It is easy to check that for this profile the necessary condition
(6) is satisfied.
Figure 2: The strong private firm case - both firms have positive output
Clearly, p∗1 and q∗1 can vary within the given ranges. Decreasing p∗1 results in lower
producer surplus for the public firm, but in an equally large increase in consumer surplus.
Thus, payoffs remain the same. Altering q∗1 shifts the residual demand curve, and results
in varying payoffs. The possible payoff intervals can also be calculated for the example:
pi1 ∈ [0.28, 0.435] and pi2 ∈ [0.04, 0.2].
3.2 Public firm moves first
We continue with the case of public leadership. Here, we have a unique family of pure-
strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, where the public firm produces its capacity limit
at a price not greater than pd2(k1). The private firm serves residual demand and acts as a
monopolist on the residual demand curve, as presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Public firm moves first). Let Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) < k2 and P (k1) > c
be satisfied. Then the set of SPNE prices and quantities are given by
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, k1, p
m
2 (k1) , q
m
2 (k1)) (11)
for any p1 ≤ pd2 (k1).
Proof. First, we determine the best reply BR2 = (p
∗
2(·, ·), q∗2(·, ·)) of the private firm.
Observe that the private firm’s best response correspondence can be obtained from the
proof of Proposition 1. BR2(p1, q1) =
{(pm2 (q1), qm2 (q1))} if p1 < pd2(q1);
{(pm2 (q1), qm2 (q1)) , (p1,min {k2, D(p1)})} if p1 = pd2(q1);
{(p1,min {k2, D(p1)})} if pd2(q1) < p1 ≤ pm2 (0);
{(pm2 (0), qm2 (0))} if pm2 (0) < p1.
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Though there are two possible best replies for the private firm to the public firm’s first-
period action
(
pd2(q1), q1
)
, in an SPNE the private firm must respond with (pm2 (q1), q
m
2 (q1))
because otherwise, there will not be an optimal first-period action for the public firm.
Hence, the public firm maximizes social surplus in the first period by choosing price p∗1 =
pd2(k1) and quantity k1. Then the private firm follows with price p
∗
2 = p
m
2 (k1) and quantity
q∗2 = qm2 (k1).
Continuing with the example of linear demand D(p) = 1 − p, we focus on the
simultaneous-move outcome, which matches the SPNE emerging in case of public leader-
ship. Let the capacities and the unit cost be k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.4 and c = 0.1, respectively.
Then the actions associated with the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium profile
are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗
1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.2) .
where p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.3]. The social surplus and the private firm’s profit are equal to pi1 = 0.435
and pi2 = 0.04.
3.3 Private firm moves first
Now we consider the case of private leadership. In this case, there exists one type of
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in which the private firm produces on the original demand
curve at the highest price level not above its its monopoly price for which it is still of the
public firm’s interest to remain on the residual demand curve and produce less than it
would produce on the original demand curve. Formally, the private firm sets price
p˜2 = max {p2 ∈ [c, pm2 (0)] | pi1(p1, Dr1(p2,min{D(p2), k2}), p2,min{D(p2), k2}) ≥
pi1(P (k1), k1, p2,min{D(p2), k2})}
in the first stage. The equilibrium profiles with their necessary conditions are given formally
in the following proposition and the existence of the price p˜2 is shown in its proof.
Proposition 3 (Private firm moves first). Let Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) < k2 and
P (k1) > c be satisfied. The equilibrium actions of the firms associated with an SPNE
are the following ones
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, D
r
1(p˜2,min{D(p˜2), k2}), p˜2,min{D(p˜2), k2}) (12)
where p∗1 ∈ [0, p˜2] can be an arbitrary price; furthermore, p∗1 ∈ (p˜2, b] are also equilibrium
prices in case of q∗1 = 0.
Proof. We determine the SPNE of the private leadership game by backwards induction
without explicitly referring to the proof of Proposition 1. For any given first-stage action
(p2, q2) of the private firm the public firm never produces less than min{Dr1(p2, q2), k1} in
the second stage. Moreover, if the public firm does not capture the entire market (i.e. the
private firm’s sales are positive), it never produces more than min{Dr1(p2, q2), k1}. If
pi1(p2,min{Dr1(p2, q2), k1}, p2, q2) ≥ pi1(P (k1), k1, p2, q2) (13)
is satisfied at a price p2 ∈ [0, b] and a quantity q2 ∈ (0, k2], then the private firm, by
choosing its first-stage action (p2, q2), becomes a monopolist on the market (in case of
q2 ≥ D(p2)) or sells its entire production (in case of q2 < D(p2)) since the public firm
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cannot increase social surplus by setting a lower price than p2 and it definitely does not set
a price above p2. To be more precise if (13) is satisfied with equality the public firm could
also respond with price P (k1) and quantity k1; however, as it can be verified later in an
SPNE the public firm does not choose the latter response. Clearly, if (13) is violated, the
public firm responds with price P (k1) and quantity k1. Therefore, we get BR1(p2, q2) =
{(p1, Dr1(p2, q2) | p1 ≤ p2)} if pi1(p1, Dr1(p2, q2), p2, q2) > pi1(P (k1), k1, p2, q2);
{(p1, k1) | p1 ≤ P (k1)} if pi1(p1, Dr1(p2, q2), p2, q2) < pi1(P (k1), k1, p2, q2);
{(p1, Dr1(p2, q2) | p1 ≤ p2)}∪
{(p1, k1) | p1 ≤ P (k1)} if pi1(p1, Dr1(p2, q2), p2, q2) = pi1(P (k1), k1, p2, q2);
Clearly, the private firm does not set a price below c jointly with a positive quan-
tity. Furthermore, the private firm can make positive profits because of qm2 (k1) < k2 and
P (k1) > c, and therefore it sets a price above c. For any given p2 > c the private firm
will never produce less than min{Dr2(p2, k1), k2} and the left hand side of (13) is con-
stant in q2 on [min{Dr2(p2, k1), k2},min{D(p2), k2}], while the profits of the private firm
are strictly increasing in q2 on the latter interval. Therefore, the private firm produces
q2 = min{D(p2), k2} if it produces at all. Henceforth, we substitute q2 = min{D(p2), k2}
in equation (13). Then the private firm would like to set price pm2 (0) if (13) is satisfied
at this price level, otherwise it sets the highest price still satisfying (13). Note that (13)
is definitely satisfied at price pm2 (0) if P (k1) ≥ pm2 (0), and otherwise the LHS of (13) is
larger than its RHS at price P (k1), the LHS is strictly decreasing and continuous, while
the RHS is strictly increasing and continuous on [P (k1), p
m
2 (0)], and therefore if (13) is not
satisfied at pm2 (0), there exists a unique price p˜ ∈ [P (k1), pm2 (0)) such that (13) is satisfied
with equality at price p˜. In the former case the private firm sets price pm2 (0), while in the
latter case price p˜ in the SPNE.
To illustrate Proposition 3 take again the linear demand curve D(p) = 1 − p. First,
let k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.4 and c = 0.1 for which p˜2 = p
m
2 (0) will be the case. The following
values can be calculated directly from the exogenously given data: pc = 0.1, pM = 0.55,
qM = 0.45, P (k2) = 0.6. In what follows, in the first stage the private firm will set
p∗2 = P (k2) = 0.6 and q∗2 = k2 = 0.4. It can be checked that for these values the public
firm has no incentive to enter the market at stage two. Thus, the actions associated with
the SPNE in this case are for all p1 ∈ [0, 1]:
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0, 0.6, 0.4)
The respective payoffs are as follows: pi1 = 0.28 and pi2 = 0.2.
Second, let k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.4 and c = 0.1 for which p˜2 < p
m
2 (0) will be the case.
Then it can be checked that the public firm will enter the market. Being aware of this, the
private firm sets the highest price level (p˜2) at which it can still sell its entire capacity so
that the public firm has no incentive to undercut the price level set by the private firm. In
this case p˜2 = 0.487. The public firm will then satisfy residual demand at p˜2 price level,
i.e. q∗1 = 0.213. The public firm can set its price to any level within [0, 0.487]. To sum up,
the actions associated with the SPNE in this case are as follows:
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0.213, 0.487, 0.4) ,
where p1 ∈ 0, 0.487. The payoffs are pi1 = 0.36 and pi2 = 0.116.
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4 The weak private firm case
The main assumption throughout this section is that the private firm does not have suf-
ficient capacity to influence the market strategically, that is why we call the private firm
weak. Formally, qm2 (k1) = k2, and in addition P (k1) > c. We begin the analysis with the
following lemma which dictates that the private firm is not intended to set any price below
the market clearing price.
Lemma 3. Assume that Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) = k2 and P (k1) > c hold true. Given
any strategy (p1, q1) of the public firm, the private firm’s strategies (p2, q2) with price level
p2 < max{pc, c} and any quantity q2 > 0 are strictly dominated, for instance by a strategy
with p2 = max{pc, c} and q2 > 0, in all three possible orderings.
Proof. If p2 < max{pc, c}, then the private firm can sell its entire capacity or makes losses,
independently from the public firm’s strategy. Clearly, given any (p1, q1) and q2 > 0,
replacing the private firm’s price level by p2 = max{pc, c}, pi2 increases, thus, the private
firm’s strategies with lower price levels become strictly dominated.
4.1 Simultaneous moves
Here, we have two main types of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. In the first type the
private firm sets the highest price level at which it can still produce on the original demand
curve. As a particular case of this equilibrium, clearing the market may emerge. The second
type contains profiles for which the private firm is a monopolist on the original demand
curve.
Proposition 4 (Simultaneous moves). Assume that Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) = k2 and
P (k1) > c hold.A strategy profile
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗
1, D
r
1(pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}) , pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}) (14)
where p∗1 ∈ [0, pˆ] in case of q∗1 > 0 and p∗1 ∈ [0, b] in case of q∗1 = 0, defines a Nash
equilibrium family in pure strategies if and only if all of the following conditions hold:
pm2 (0) ≥ pˆ ≥ pm2 (q∗1) (15)
and
pi1(p
c, k1, pˆ, q
∗
2) ≤ pi1(p∗1, q∗1, pˆ, q∗2). (16)
In particular, if pˆ = pc, then (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) = (p∗1, k1, pc, k2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) is an arbitrary equilibrium profile. It can be verified
that q∗1 + q∗2 = D(p′), where p′ stands for the highest price from p∗1, p∗2 at which at least
one firm sells a positive amount. Like in the analysis of the strong private firm case, we
divide our analysis into three subcases. In the first case (Case A) we have p∗1 = p∗2, in the
second one (Case B) p∗1 > p∗2 holds, while in the remaining case we have p∗1 < p∗2 (Case C).
Case A: By Lemma 3 we have p∗1 = p∗2 ≥ pc. First, we verify that the strategy
profile given by (14) is a Nash-equilibrium profile for any pˆ ≥ pc if (15) and (16) are
satisfied. Hence, firms set quantities q∗2 = min {k2, D(pˆ)} and q∗1 = Dr1(pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}).
By the second inequality in (15), the private firm has no incentive to increase its price.
If D(pˆ) ≥ k2, then decreasing p2 is trivially irrational for the private firm that al-
ready sells its entire capacity. In case k2 > D(pˆ), we obtain a particular equilibrium
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(p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) = (p∗, 0, pˆ, D(pˆ)), which means that the public firm is not present on the
market, and therefore, by the first inequality in (15) the private firm has no incentive to
decrease its price.
Now we consider the public firm’s actions. Clearly, increasing the public firm’s price
would not increase, but in fact reduce total surplus if q∗1 > 0. Moreover, prices p∗1 = p∗2 = pc
with quantities q∗1 = Dr1(pˆ,min {k2, D(pc)}) = k1 and q∗2 = min {k2, D(pc)} = k2 would
result in the best possible outcome for the public firm. Hence, we still have to investigate
the effect of a potential price decrease by the public firm in case of p∗1 = p∗2 > pc. If the
public firm reduces its price without increasing its quantity, obviously total surplus cannot
increase. To analyze the case in which the public firm decreases its price and increases its
quantity at the same time, observe that the sum of consumer surplus and the two firms’
revenues (which equals pi1(p1, q1, p2, q2) + c(q1 + q2)) is only a function of the highest price
at which sales are still positive. Therefore, total surplus is strictly decreasing in q1 on
(q∗1, D(pˆ)) and strictly increasing in q1 on [D(pˆ), k1] for a given p1 < p∗1. To see the latter
statement notice that within [D(pˆ), k1] the superfluous production of the private firm
remains the same, that is its entire production. Hence, we have shown that the benchmark
action of the public firm in order to determine whether the public firm has an incentive
to reduce its price is (pc, k1), which is in line with (16).
Turning to the case where (15) is violated, we show that (14) cannot be a Nash-
equilibrium profile. If pˆ < pm2 (q
∗
1) the private firm will increase its price until p
m
2 (q1) to
become a monopolist on the residual demand curve, where we are not anymore in Case A
of our analysis. Note that any p∗1 ∈ [0, pˆ] results in the same outcome, but if p∗1 6= p∗2, we
are again either in Case B or in Case C. If pm2 (0) < pˆ, the private firm will switch to price
pm2 (0).
As a special case of pˆ = pc, clearing the market is always a Nash equilibrium for the
following reason: by pc ≥ pm2 (k1) the private firm cannot be better off by unilaterally
increasing its price even by reducing its quantity, accordingly. Note that the market-
clearing equilibrium ensures that an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists in the
weak private firm case.
Now we show that no other equilibrium exists given that p∗1 = p∗2 ≥ pc. Assume that
q∗2 < min {k2, D(p∗1)}. In such cases the private firm gets better off by slightly undercutting
p∗1 and selling q∗2 = min {k2, D(p∗1 − ε)}. Now assume that q∗1 6= Dr1(p∗1,min {k2, D(p∗1)}. If
the left hand side is larger, then there is superfluous production that results in surplus
loss; if the left hand side is smaller, then there is a loss in consumer surplus. Thus, there
are no more equlibria, if p∗1 = p∗2.
Case B: By Lemma 3 p∗1 > p∗2 ≥ pc. By decreasing p1 to p∗2, the public firm can always
increase social surplus, unless q∗1 = 0. In the extreme case of q∗1 = 0, p∗1 can obviously be
any nonnegative amount. Besides, if k2 ≥ D(p∗2) and (16) holds, we arrive to the Nash
equilibria in which the private firm sets price pm2 (0). If k2 < D(p
∗
2), then the public firm
can increase social surplus by setting price p1 = p
∗
2 and quantity q
∗
1 = D(p
∗
2)− k2.
Case C: Now we have p∗2 > p∗1. As already shown in Case A, this case emerges in
equilibrium if (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) = (p∗, Dr1(pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}) , pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}), and p∗1 < pˆ,
that is, we have the Nash equilibrium mentioned in the statement. It remains to show
that there is no other possible equilibrium in this case. If p∗2 > p∗1, then p∗2 = pm2 (q∗1)
and q∗2 = Dr2(p∗2, q∗1) = qm2 (q∗1) must hold, since otherwise the private firm’s payoff would
be strictly lower. The arguments for this are analogous to those mentioned in the strong
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private firm case.15 As qm2 (k1) = k2, due to the fact that q
m
2 (·) is decreasing16 in q1, for
any q1 < k1, q
m
2 (q1) > q
m
2 (k1) = k2. Thus, q
∗
2 must equal k2. It is easy to see that for this
case the only possible type of equilibrium is characterized in the statement.
In case of linear demand D(p) = 1− p the weak private firm case emerges if k1 = 0.9,
k2 = 0.02, c = 0.01. From these exogenously given values we can determine p
c = 0.08 and
p˜2 = 0.102. In this case we have several Nash equilibrium profiles, which are not payoff
equivalent. For all pˆ ∈ [0.08, 0.102] and any p1 ∈ [0, pˆ],
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0.98− pˆ, pˆ, 0.02)
defines the family of Nash equilibrium profiles. In particular, if pˆ = pc, then
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0.9, 0.08, 0.02)
and the social surplus associated to the market clearing equilibrium is pi1 = 0.4876, while
the private firm’s profit is pi2 = 0.0014.
In the case in which the firms do not choose the market clearing price, let pˆ = 0.102
(see Figure 3). Then the equilibrium profile is
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0.878, 0.102, 0.02),
the corresponding payoffs are pi1 = 0.4858 (the sum of dark and light gray areas) and
pi2 = 0.0018 (the light gray area indicated by pi2).
Figure 3: The weak private firm case - both firms have positive output
Clearly, for the equilibrium family pi2(·) is increasing in pˆ, while pi1(·) is decreasing
in pˆ. The payoff intervals can also be calculated, in particular, pi1 ∈ [0.4858, 0.4876],
pi2 ∈ [0.0014, 0.0018].
15In particular, if the private firm sets a price not greater than p∗1, we are not anymore in Case C; if
q∗2 > D
r
2(p
∗
2, q
∗
1), then the private firm produces a superflous amount; if q
∗
2 < D
r
2(p
∗
2, q
∗
1), then the private
firm could still sell more than q∗2 ; and if q
∗
2 = D
r
2(p
∗
2, q
∗
1), then the private firm will choose a price-quantity
pair maximizing profits with respect to its residual demand curve Dr2(·, q∗1).
16Because pm2 (·) is a decreasing function in q1
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4.2 Public firm moves first
The case of public leadership is somewhat simpler. Namely, the firms clear the market in
the only equilibrium family.17 The results of public leadership are collected in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 (Public leadership). Assume that Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) ≥ k2 and
P (k1) > c hold. Then the prices and quantities associated with the pure strategy SPNE are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗, k1, pc, k2)
where p∗ ∈ [0, P (k1)].
Proof. We determine the reaction function BR2 = (p
∗
2(·, ·), q∗2(·, ·)) of the private firm.
Like in the strong private firm case, the private firm’s best response correspondence can
be obtained from the proof of Proposition 4, the corresponding simultaneous case.
BR2(p1, q1) =
{
(p1,min {k2, Dr2(p1, q1)}) if pm2 (q1) ≤ p1;
(pm2 (q1), q
m
2 (q1)) if p
m
2 (q1) > p1.
(17)
The reaction function dictates that the public firm maximizes social surplus in the first
period by choosing any price level p∗1 ≤ pc and quantity k1.
Recall the calculations of illuminating example of linear demand for the simultaneous-
move case matching the actions associated with the only Nash-equilibrium in case of public
leadership. Let the capacities and the unit cost be k1 = 0.9, k2 = 0.02 and c = 0.01. Then
pc = 0.08. The public firm will sell its entire capacity at a p∗1 ∈ [0, pc] market clearing
price. The private firm will react with the market clearing price, and will also sell its
entire capacity. This ensures the highest possible social surplus in this setting. Thus, for
all p1 ∈ [0, 0.08] the actions associated with the SPNE are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0.9, 0.08, 0.02),
where the corresponding payoffs are pi1 = 0.4876 and pi2 = 0.0014.
4.3 Private firm moves first
Finally, we consider the case of private leadership. The only pure-strategy equilibrium
family of this case also appears in the simultaneous-moves subcase of the weak private
firm case. Namely, the private firm produces on the original demand curve at the highest
possible price level for which it is still in the public firm’s interest to allow the private firm
to do so. The equilibrium family is given formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Private leadership). Assume that Assumptions 1-3, qm2 (k1) ≥ k2 and
P (k1) > c hold. Then the prices and quantities associated with the pure strategy SPNE are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗, Dr1(pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}), pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)})
where p∗ ∈ [0, pˆ], if and only if pˆ ≥ pc and p∗2 = pˆ is the highest price level for which
pi1(p
c, k1, pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}) ≤ pi1(p∗, Dr1(pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}), pˆ,min {k2, D(pˆ)}) (18)
17We speak about family, because p∗1 can vary within a given range
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Proof. We determine the reaction function BR1 = (p
∗
1(·, ·), q∗1(·, ·)) of the public firm.
The public firm’s best response correspondence can also be obtained from the proof of
Proposition 4, the corresponding simultaneous-move case.
BR1(p2, q2) =
{
(p∗, k1) if (18) does not hold;
(p2, D
r
1(p2, q2)) if (18) holds.
(19)
where p∗ ∈ [0, pˆ].
The reaction function dictates that the private firm maximizes its profit in the first
period by choosing the highest possible price level, where the public firm is still better
off (i.e. the social surplus is higher) by reacting with the same price and serving residual
demand, than by undercutting p2.
18 A highest price level pˆ exists for every demand func-
tion, because if both firms choose price level pc and sell their entire capacities (i.e. they
clear the market), then Condition (18) always holds.
Recall the calculations from the simultaneous-move case for linear demand. Let the
capacities and the unit cost be k1 = 0.9, k2 = 0.02 and c = 0.01. Then p˜2 = 0.102. The
private firm will choose p∗2 = p˜2 and sells its entire capacity. The public firm will serve
residual demand as it is not worth to undercutting the private firm’s price which would
cause superfluous production. Thus, for all p1 ∈ [0, 0.102] the actions associated with the
only SPNE are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p1, 0.878, 0.102, 0.02),
where the corresponding payoffs are pi1 = 0.4858 and pi2 = 0.0018.
5 The high unit cost case
The main assumption of this case is c ≥ P (k1). In this case if the public firm produces at
its capacity level, then the private firm will not enter the market because of the high cost
level.
5.1 Simultaneous moves
In this subcase we have two types of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The first type consists
of profiles in which the private firm sets a price and produces a quantity on the residual
demand curve, where in the particular case when the public firm does not produce anything
in equilibrium, the residual demand curve coincides with the demand curve. In the second
type, the public firm produces its capacity limit, while the private firm does not enter the
market.
Proposition 7 (Simultaneous moves). Assume that c ≥ P (k1) and Assumptions 1-3 hold.
A strategy profile NE1
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗
1, q
∗
1, p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1))
is for any price-quantity pair
(p∗1, q
∗
1) ∈
{
(p1, q1) | 0 < q1 < D(c), 0 ≤ p1 ≤ pd2 (q1)
}⋃
(20)
{(p1, q1) | q1 = 0, 0 ≤ p1 ≤ b} (21)
18Depending on the parameters, it can also occur that the public firm has zero output on the residual
demand curve.
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a Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies19 if and only if
pi1(0, D(c), p
m
2 (q
∗
1) , q
m
2 (q
∗
1)) ≤ pi1(p∗1, q∗1, pm2 (q∗1) , qm2 (q∗1)). (22)
A strategy profile NE2
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗
1, D(c), p
∗
2, 0)
where p∗1 ∈ [0, c], and p∗2 ∈ [0, b], also defines a Nash equilibrium family. Finally, no other
equilibrium exists in pure strategies.
Proof. Assume that (p∗1, q∗1, p∗2, q∗2) is an arbitrary equilibrium profile. We divide our anal-
ysis into two subcases. In the first case the private firm is inactive (i.e. q∗2 = 0), while in
the second case it is active on the market (i.e. q∗2 > 0)
Case A: Assume that q∗2 = 0, which means that only the public firm’s production is
positive, and since c > P (k1) it sets a price p
∗
1 ≤ c and quantity q∗1 = D(c) in order to
maximize social surplus. Therefore, only NE2 type equilibria can emerge. We verify that
indeed NE2 specifies equilibrium profiles. Clearly, the public firm would reduce social
surplus by switching unilaterally from its NE2 strategy to a non NE2 one. The private
firm makes losses when producing a positive amount at a price p∗2 < c. In addition,
Dr2(p
∗
2, D(c)) = 0 for all prices p
∗
2 ≥ c by c > P (k1) if the public firm plays an NE2
strategy, and thus once again the private firm will just make losses if it produces a positive
amount at a price p∗2 ≥ c.
Case B: Assume that q∗2 > 0, which implies p∗2 ≥ c since otherwise the private firm
would make losses. We divide our analysis into four subcases.
Subcase (i): Assume that p∗1 = p∗2 > c. Clearly, we cannot have q∗1 + q∗2 < D(p∗1)
since otherwise the public firm could increase social surplus by increasing its production
because of c > P (k1). Obviously, we cannot have q
∗
1 + q
∗
2 > D(p
∗
1) since then the public
firm would have an incentive to reduce its production if q∗1 > 0 or the private firm could
gain from decreasing its production if q∗1 = 0. In case of q∗1 + q∗2 = D(p∗1) we must have
q∗2 = min {k2, D(p∗2)} and q∗1 = Dr1(p∗2,min {k2, D(p∗2)}) (23)
since otherwise the private firm could radically increase its sales by a unilateral and suffi-
ciently small price decrease.
Now we investigate when a strategy profile with prices p∗1 = p∗2 > c and quantities
given by (23) constitutes a Nash equilibrium profile. The private firm can benefit from
setting higher prices if and only if p∗2 < pm2 (q∗1). Moreover, the private firm can benefit
from setting lower prices if and only if p∗2 > pm2 (q∗1), which in fact can only be the case20
if q∗1 = 0, because the private firm is not constrained by the production of the public firm
by (23). Therefore, in a Subcase (i) equilibrium profile we must have p∗1 = p∗2 = pm2 (q∗1) =
pd2 (q
∗
1) > c.
21 Clearly, if q∗1 > 0, then the public firm would decrease social surplus by a
price increase (independently of a simultaneous quantity adjustment). If q∗1 = 0, then the
public firm still will not benefit from setting higher prices. In addition, the public firm
would not gain from setting a lower price if and only if (22) is satisfied.
To summarize, Subcase (i) admits those price-quantity pairs (p∗1, q∗1) from the set spec-
ified by (20) for which p∗1 = pd2 (q∗1) results in equal prices.
19Recall that q1 < D(c)⇔ P (q1) > c. In addition, q1 > 0 implies c < pd2 (q1) < pm2 (q1).
20If k2 ≤ D(p∗2), a price decrease cannot increase the private firm’s profit, and if k2 > D(p∗2), q∗1 = 0.
21Observe that this also implies P (q∗1) > c.
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Subcase (ii): Assume that p∗1 = p∗2 = c. As shown in Subcase (i) we must have
q∗1+q∗2 = D(p∗1). In addition, it can be easily checked that the private firm can benefit from a
unilateral deviation if and only if pm2 (q
∗
1) ∈ (c, a). Since q∗1 < D(c) implies pm2 (q∗1) ∈ (c, a)
it follows that q∗1 = D(c) should be the case, which would imply q∗2 = 0, leading to a
departure from Case B. Hence, a Subcase (ii) equilibrium does not exist.
Subcase (iii): Assume that p∗1 > p∗2 ≥ c. Then there cannot be an equilibrium in
which q∗1 > 0 because the public firm could increase social surplus by switching to price p∗2
and quantity (D(p∗2)− q∗2)+. Furthermore, in case of q∗1 = 0 we must have q∗2 = D(p∗2) ≤ k2
since otherwise the public firm could again increase social surplus by switching to price
p∗2 and quantity (D(p∗2)− q∗2)+. Therefore, in a Subcase (iii) type equilibrium the private
firm behaves as a monopolist, and thus p∗2 = pm2 (0) must be the case, which in turn is an
equilibrium if and only if the public firm has no incentive to enter the market, that is (22)
is satisfied.
Observe that the derived equilibrium is an NE1 type equilibrium and the respective
price-quantity pairs (p∗1, q∗1) are a subset of the set specified by (21).
Subcase (iv): Assume that p∗1 < p∗2 and p∗2 ≥ c. In case of Dr2(c, q∗1) = 0 we must
have q∗2 = 0, which has been already investigated in Case A. Therefore, in what follows
we can assume that Dr2(c, q
∗
1) > 0, which in turn implies that p
m
2 (q
∗
1) ∈ (c, a) and that
pd2(q
∗
1) ∈ (c, pm2 (q∗1)) is well defined. Observe that we must have q∗1 + q∗2 = D(p∗2) since
otherwise, for instance, the public firm could increase social surplus by either increasing
or decreasing its output. It can be checked that the private firm does not undercut the
public firm’s price if and only if p∗1 ≤ pd2(q∗1). Moreover, if the private firm does not
undercut the public firm’s price, then it will set price pm2 (q
∗
1) and quantity q
m
2 (q
∗
1). The
derived strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium profile if and only if the public firm
has no incentive to deviate, that is (22) is satisfied.
It can be checked that we have determined an NE1 type equilibrium and the re-
spective price-quantity pairs (p∗1, q∗1) lie in the set specified by (20), where q∗1 > 0 and
p∗1 ∈ [0, pd2(0)] ⊂ [0, pm2 (0)] resulting in a higher price for the private firm.22
Pick the capacities and unit cost levels k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.1, c = 0.6 and let D(p) = 1−p,
which lead to the high unit cost case. We give examples to the equlibria in the order they
are listed in the statement. Firstly, from these exogenously given values we can calculate
the interval where pˆ can be taken from, leading to Nash equilibria which are not payoff
equivalent: pˆ ∈ [0.6, 0.8]. We can choose pˆ = 0.8 (see Figure 4). This leads to the following
values: p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.8]; q∗1 = 0.1; p∗2 = 0.8; q∗2 = 0.1. In this case pi1 = 0.06 (sum of dark and
light gray areas); pi2 = 0.04 (light gray area indicated by pi2).
Depending on pˆ, profit levels can vary in the following intervals: pi1 ∈ [0.06, 0.08] and
pi2 ∈ [0, 0.04].
Turning to the second equilibrium type, where the private firm is not present on the
market, we obtain p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.5]; q∗1 = 0.5; p∗2 ∈ R; q∗2 = 0. Profit levels are as follows:
pi1 = 0.08; pi2 = 0.
Finally, for the illustration of the third equilibrium we have that any q1 ∈ [0, k1] leads
to a Nash equilibrium. Let us fix q1 = 0.3. Now p
m
2 (0.3) = 0.65 an p
d
2(0.3) = 0.325. Thus,
p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.325]; q∗1 = 0.3; p∗2 = 0.65; q∗2 = 0.05. In this case, pi1 = 0.0787 and pi2 = 0.0013.
22It can be verified that we have obtained all NE1 type equilibria.
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Figure 4: The high unit cost case - both firms have positive output - case 1
Depending on q1, profit levels can vary in the following intervals: pi1 ∈ [0.06, 0.08] and
pi2 ∈ [0, 0.04].23
Figure 5: The high unit cost case - both firms have positive output - case 2
5.2 Public firm moves first
In the high unit cost case with public leadership we obtain that the private firm does
not enter the market, while the public firm’s output equals its capacity. This result is
formalized in the following proposition.
23We note that here p∗1 < c, still, it is of the public firms interest to produce a positive amount, as this
action leads to a positive change in consumer surplus. This is the reason why there is no producer surplus
indicated on the left-hand-side of Figure 5.
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Proposition 8 (Public leadership). Assume that c > P (k1) and Assumptions 1-3 hold.
Then the prices and quantities associated with the pure strategy SPNE are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗, D(c), p∗2, 0)
where p∗ ∈ [0, c] and p∗2 ∈ [0, b].
Proof. We determine the reaction function BR2 = (p
∗
2(·, ·), q∗2(·, ·)) of the private firm. The
private firm’s best response correspondence can be obtained from the proof of Proposition
7, the corresponding simultaneous-move case.
BR2(p1, q1) =

{(p, 0) | p ∈ [0, b]} if D(c) ≤ q1 ≤ k1 and p1 ≤ c;
{(p1,min {k2, D(p1)})} if pd2(q1) < p1 and p1 > c;
{(p1,min {k2, D(p1)})}∪
{(pm2 (q1), qm2 (q1))} if pd2(q1) = p1 and p1 > c;
{(pm2 (q1), qm2 (q1))} if pd2(q1) ≥ p1 and p1 > c.
(24)
Note that the above four areas partition [0, b]× [0, k1] since q1 < D(c) implies pd2(q1) > c.
From the derived reaction function it follows that the public firm maximizes social surplus
in the first period by choosing any price level p∗ ∈ [0, c] and quantity k1.
Recall the outcome of the simultaneous case when setting the parameters to k1 = 0.5,
k2 = 0.1, and c = 0.6, and picking demand curve D(p) = 1− p. Then the the private firm
is not present on the market, and we obtain p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.5], q∗1 = 0.5, p∗2 ∈ R, and q∗2 = 0.
Payoffs equal pi1 = 0.08 and pi2 = 0.
5.3 Private firm moves first
Finally, we consider the case of private leadership. We will establish for this case that in
equilibrium the private firm chooses the highest price level at which the public firm does
not capture the entire market at price c or smaller. The respective price is determined
either as the price at which the public firm is indifferent between matching the private
firm’s price and capturing the entire market at a price less than or equal to c and producing
D(c), despite the fact that the production of the private firm may be wasted, or by the
private firm’s monopoly price.
Proposition 9 (Private leadership). Assume that c ≥ P (k1) and Assumptions 1-3 hold.
Then there exists a unique price p∗2 ∈ (c, pm2 (0)] such that the prices and quantities associ-
ated with the pure strategy SPNE are
(p∗1, q
∗
1, p
∗
2, q
∗
2) = (p
∗
1, D
r
1(p
∗
2,min {k2, D(p∗2)}), p∗2,min {k2, D(p∗)})
where p∗1 ∈ [0, p∗2],
Proof. Clearly, if the private firm does not produce anything, i.e. q2 = 0, then the public
firm follows with (p1, D(c)) such that p1 ≤ c. If the private firm’s production is positive,
i.e. q2 > 0, then we must have p2 ≥ c. Furthermore, the private firm never produces more
than D(p2).
Focusing on the SPNE, we determine the best replies of the public firm only to the
first-stage actions of the private firm lying in
A = {(p2, 0) | p2 ∈ [0, b]} ∪ {(p2, q2) | p2 ∈ [c, b] and q2 ∈ (0, D(p2)]} .
20
For a given (p2, q2) ∈ A such that q2 ∈ (0, D(p2)] the public firm never sets a price above
p2 if it decides to produce at all, i.e. q1 > 0. Moreover, in the latter case the public firm’s
production has to equal q1 = D
r
1(p2, q2), since if it does not capture the entire market,
social surplus will be determined at price p2 and superfluous production decreases social
surplus. Therefore, the response of the public firm is determined by inequality
pi1(0, D(c), p2, q2) ≤ pi1(c,Dr1(p2, q2), p2, q2), (25)
where its response equals BR1(p2, q2) = {(p1, Dr1(p2, q2)) | p1 ≤ c} if q2 > 0 and (25) is
satisfied, and BR1(p2, q2) = {(p1, D(c) | p1 ≤ c} if q2 = 0 and (25) is violated.24
Taking the best responses of the public firm into consideration, the private firm
will produce q2 = min{k2, D(p2)} at price p2 if (25) is satisfied.25 By substituting
q2 = min{k2, D(p2)} into (25) it follows that the right-hand side of (25) is continuous,
strictly decreasing in p2 on [c, p
m
2 (0)], and it is larger than its left-hand side at price
p2 = c. Since the private firm does not set a price above p
m
2 (0) it will either set the price
in (c, pm2 (0)) for which (25) is satisfied with equality or price p
m
2 (0).
Pick linear demand and let the capacities and the unit costs be k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.1,
c = 0.6. Then as it can be determined pˆ = 0.8. This leads us to p∗1 ∈ [0, 0.8]; q∗1 = 0.1;
p∗2 = 0.8; q∗2 = 0.1, which implies pi1 = 0.06; pi2 = 0.04.
6 Solution of the timing game
We consider a timing in which the firms in stage 1 can choose between two periods for
the announcement of their price and quantity decision. Thereafter, knowing each others
timing decision, the firms in stage 2 set their prices and quantities in the selected periods.
The equilibrium of the timing game can be derived from Propositions 1-9, by comparing
the payoffs of both firms for different orderings of moves.
Before we turn to the solution of the timing game, we provide a summary of the payoffs
that were calculated in the numerical examples after Propositions 1-9, respectively. Table
1 provides numerical evidence of the solution of the timing game for the particular demand
function D(p) = 1− p, with exogenously given capacities and cost levels.
It is easy to see from Table 1 that in all the three main cases any firm has the highest
payoff with certainty in case it is the first mover. Thus, as every firm wants to become
the leader and there cannot be two leaders at the same time, the outcome of the timing
game is simultaneous moves. The equilibrium of the timing game for any concave, twice
continuously differentiable demand function is precisely stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Assume that Assumptions 1-3 hold. For any cost and capacity levels,
the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves.
Proof. The result comes directly from Propositions 1-9.
7 Corollaries and concluding remarks
Our main results are collected in the following corollaries. We focus on the differences
between the production-to-order case - which was investigated in earlier work - and the
24To be precise if (25) is satisfied with equality, then both mentioned types are best responses; however,
as it can be verified in a SPNE only the former type can be selected.
25Note that the distribution of production between the two firms does not effect (25).
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Cases Strong private firm Weak private firm High unit cost
k1 0.5 0.9 0.5
k2 0.4 0.02 0.1
c 0.1 0.01 0.6
pi1: Public firm’s equilibrium payoff (social surplus)
sim. moves ∈ [0.28, 0.435] ∈ [0.4858, 0.4876] ∈ [0.06, 0.08]
as leader 0.435 0.4876 0.08
as follower 0.28 0.4858 0.06
pi2: Private firm’s equilibrium payoff (profit)
sim. moves ∈ [0.04, 0.2] ∈ [0.0014, 0.0018] ∈ [0, 0.04]
as leader 0.2 0.0018 0.04
as follower 0.04 0.0014 0
Table 1: Example payoff levels for the demand function D(p) = 1− p
production-in-advance case from the point of view of equilibrium strategies, social surplus
effects and equilibrium analysis of the timing game. The first corollary determines the
endogenous order of moves in a two-period timing game of the production-in-advance
framework, where both firms can choose between two periods for setting their prices and
quantities.
Corollary 1. In the production-in-advance framework both firms want to become the first
mover, therefore the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves.
We turn to the problem of the public firm’s influence on social surplus. One can carry
out a comparison with the results for the production-to-order case presented in Balogh
and Tasna´di (2012). In the PIA case the social surplus becomes lower - let them play any
pure-strategy Nash equilbria - than that of the PTO case. This result is put down in the
next corollary.
Corollary 2. When playing the production-in-advance type of the Bertrand-Edgeworth
game, the equilibrium strategies lead to a decrease in social surplus compared to the PTO
case.
The third main result of the paper is implicitely given in Section 5: independently
from the parameters and the orderings of firms’ decisions, the production-in-advance type
Bertrand-Edgeworth mixed duopoly always has at least one pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium. This result remained the same as that of the mixed PTO case. However, we
emphasize that in case of standard Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies, there is a lack of pure-
strategy equilibria (see e.g. Deneckere and Kovenock (1992)). We state the existence of a
pure-strategy equilibrium in the third corollary.
Corollary 3. We have at least one pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium in
all three analyzed cases and for all three orderings of moves.
These results are summarized in the following table.
The results suggest that it is by far not all the same whether a public firm has some
influence on an oligopoly market. Further research directions may include the applica-
tion of our model to markets with asymmetric information, partial public ownership, and
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Production-to-order Production-in-advance
Equilibrium in pure strategies Yes Yes
Timing game equlibrium All possible orderings Simultaneous moves
Public firms’s social surplus effect Positive Negative26
Table 2: Comparison of the PTO and PIA cases
oligopolies with more than two firms. One can notice that our assumptions were quite gen-
eral in the present paper. However, to present plausible results in the mentioned topics,
more strict assumptions may be needed.
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